Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Strategies, February to June 1942

The book revealed that Japanese naval forces, despite of all its abilities, superior ships and planes and its highly trained crew, could not defeat its outnumbered enemies due to poor strategy. It was clear that the Japanese have badly over extended themselves and try to be too clever with their strategies which backfired on them.

I agreed with the previous reviewer that the author, H.P. Willmott was bit too judgmental on the wrong sides at times. A good example would be those Japanese raids into the Indian Ocean which was a terrible waste of men and material, especially since the British navy in that area served as no threat and primary duty of the Imperial Navy was to chased down the American carriers. But on the other hand, I thought Willmott's condemnation of Admiral Yamamoto was right on the mark. Too long have this Japanese admiral been overrated by many historians based on one successful attack on Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto fumbled terribly at Midway. (Personally, I thought he fumbled badly at Pearl Harbor too.) The author also cites superior American military intelligence as well as a lot of luck to win a battle of Midway that the Japanese should have won hands down.

Anyone with any interest in this subject should be reading this very insightful book. Its not really for casual reader so I would recommended folks who already have a good background on the Pacific War to tackled this book. A good companion book to Willmot's earlier book, Empires in the Balance, both books, in my humble opinion, belong to any library of a military historian who got an interest in this field.


The Battles of Coral Sea and Midway   December 16, 2002
 8 out of 8 found this review helpful

This book is about Japanese and American planning and strategy in the naval battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. At the Coral Sea in May 1942, the Americans scored their first semi-victory of World War II. At Midway in June 1942 the Americans stunned the over-confident Japanese by sinking four of their aircraft carriers at the loss of one of their own.

Willmott's theme is that Japan should have won both battles against an out-numbered and inexperienced American navy, but did not because of woolly strategy and poor planning. At Midway Japan had two objectives: conquer the island and destroy the American fleet. These objectives should have been reversed in priority. Moreover, Japan split its superior naval forces into three isolated groups and thus permitted the Americans to meet and fight one of these groups on equal terms. The Japanese also assumed that the Americans would always do exactly what Japan wanted them to do and were unprepared for surprises.

The Americans, on their part, had superior intelligence (based on breaking Japanese codes), more durable ships and planes, and good luck. Willmott illustrates luck in his minute-by-minute examination of the mishaps of the Japanese in locating the American fleet at Midway. First, mechanical problems delayed the dispatch of a scout plane for half an hour and, next, the pilot inexplicably lingered near the American fleet for an hour before he reported the presence of carriers, an oversight that paralyzed the Japanese when they should have been attacking. As a result, American bombers scored first -- and decisive -- strikes against the Japanese carriers. But, Midway was a very near thing! 41 American torpedo bombers attacked in the first wave -- and only five came home again.

Willmott, a Brit, is opinionated and in the course of 500 pages, he makes some judgments I found questionable. For example, he seems to think it would have been a good idea for the Japanese navy to invade the Indian ocean and expel the British. That seems like a very bad idea. In my opinion, after the fall of Singapore in February 1942, Japan's overwhelming priority should have been to destroy the American aircraft carriers in the Pacific- but Japan dithered with raids on Ceylon and Australia and invasions of New Guinea. The delay proved to be fatal.

This is a good book for those whose interests go toward detailed examination of the thought processes of military planners and the battlefield decisions of leaders in charge of ships, planes, and men. Willmott probes deeply and provocatively into the calculations and miscalculations of men at war.