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Iraq, Vietnam, and the Limits of American Power | 
 enlarge | Author: Robert K. Brigham
Publisher: PublicAffairs
Category: Book
List Price: $13.95
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Avg. Customer Rating:  4 reviews
Sales Rank: 384822
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 240
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.6
Dimensions (in): 8.1 x 5.4 x 0.7
ISBN: 1586484990
Dewey Decimal Number: 320
EAN: 9781586484996
ASIN: 1586484990
Publication Date: July 21, 2008
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Product Description
Vietnam and Iraq are now linked forever. But a straight comparison between the two wars does injustice to solid history. In this revised and updated edition of Is Iraq Another Vietnam? historian Robert K. Brigham shows how the similarities between Iraq and Vietnam illuminate similar patterns of U.S. foreign policy behavior. A Vietnam expert, Brigham argues that the United States has turned to a foreign policy of expansion in times if external threat- or heightened threat perceptions- leading to limited Congressional debate and oversight. The results have been devastating. The massive financial hangover will be only one of the Iraq War's lasting legacies. The mechanisms are in place for change, but so far the U.S. has done little to alter the course of its foreign relations. It is crucial that we apply the lessons of Vietnam wisely and selectively- in this war and the future.
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 Clear, detailed comparison and analysis April 18, 2007
6 out of 6 found this review helpful
This is the kind of book that gets assigned in political science classes at our universities. It is reasonable and reasoned. Its author, Robert K. Brigham, is a professor of history and international relations at Vassar College and an acknowledged expert on the Vietnam War. Consequently, he is in a good position to compare and contrast that war with the current one.
The war in Iraq differs from that in Vietnam in many important respects; nonetheless there are also similarities, is perhaps a good summation of Brigham's thesis. Clearly one difference is that in Vietnam we intervened to prop up a regime, whereas in Iraq we invaded in order to destroy a regime. Another is that in Vietnam we had the plausible national security justification that we were stopping the spread of communism. No such logic could be applied to Iraq, unless of course we accept the notion that maintaining our access to oil in the Middle East is a national security consideration, and that further, invading Iraq would work toward that goal.
The similarities include fighting a war against an enemy that has the support of a large segment (if not a majority) of the population, an enemy that cannot be easily overcome with superior fire power or the use of traditional strategies of conventional warfare. Another similarity is that both wars were justified by false reports, in Vietnam the Gulf of Tonkin attacks, and in Iraq the weapons of mass destruction that weren't there and the phony connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda. A third similarity is that initially both wars enjoyed wide public support and presidents Johnson and George W. Bush were given free reign by Congress to pursue their objectives; but after many failures and impending defeat, the public and Congress turned against the wars.
Professor Brigham points to a number of other similarities and differences in a most compelling way. He ends the book with the warning that failure in Iraq may very well lead to an "Iraq Syndrome" similar to the "Vietnam Syndrome" that reduced the ability of the United States to act effectively in other parts of the world for many years thereafter. We can see that Brigham, whose book was finished sometime between the spring of 2006 and the midterm elections in November, was prescient here since it is painfully obvious that we cannot intervene militarily in Iran to stop their nuclear weapons program because of our failure in Iraq and because we have so many of our military resources tied up there and in Afghanistan (and elsewhere).
It should be noted that Brigham does not entertain arguments about why Bush invaded Iraq. Instead he accepts the neoconservative view that we did it to foster democracy in the Middle East, thereby theoretically increasing national security at home. In this he is disingenuous since the real reasons for Bush's invasion of Iraq are at best unclear and at worse shameful. Nowhere does Brigham mention oil as a reason for the invasion. Instead he writes "Idealism and nobility of purpose, then, drove the United States to intervene in Vietnam and Iraq." (p. 138) But the truth is we intervened in Vietnam to oppose communist expansion, and our initial goal ostensibly in Iraq was to depose Saddam Hussein and install a regime friendly to American interests in the region.
Sometimes Brigham's expression makes it clear that he realizes that "idealism and nobility" have little to do with America's foreign policy, such as this formulation, "Now...[after we have seen that there were no WMD or ties to Al-Qaeda] the war in Iraq can be characterized instead as a nation-building experiment to promote democracy..." (p. 163) Note well the "can be characterized." We know (and Brigham reminds us) that in the Bush-Kerry debates, George W. made it clear that he didn't believe in nation building. Did he change his mind or can "nation building" be used as a justification for an invasion for other reasons? My belief, for what it's worth, is that Bush invaded Iraq primarily for personal reasons: to go one up on his dad, to help his Big Oil friends, and to make sure that he, unlike his father, would have the advantage in 2004 of seeking reelection as a wartime president.
Often Brigham will make a point not by stating it directly, but by attributing it to some segment of the population or the political spectrum. For example, he writes, "...there is a growing feeling among many Americans that the Defense Department is not the place to invest resources for promoting democracy, economic development, and the rule of law." But then he follows this up with what clearly IS his own expression: "Perhaps it is time to embrace the lessons of Vietnam and to understand that democracy cannot be imposed by outsiders." (p. 166)
There are five chapters in the book organized in a way that mirrors our experience in the two wars: first there is the pretext for war, Chapter One: "America Goes to War"; then there is the war itself, Chapter Two: "The Military Half," and Chapter Three: "The Problems of Nation Building"; followed by dealing with the situation as things go sour, Chapter Four: "Staying the Course"; and finally the consequences, Chapter Five: "Challenges to America's Power."
This is a well-thought out, clearly expressed and very nicely edited and presented book directed at both the general reader and professionals. For the most part Brigham does not take sides, but limits himself to presenting the facts as he knows them coupled with an informed analysis.
A good comparison. December 18, 2006
1 out of 2 found this review helpful
The author compares the Iraq war and the Vietnam War. He looks at differences and similarities between the two. And I think that Brigham has done a good job in pulling forth valid, good and even important examples of differences and similarities.
If you're interested in American foreign politics, or interested in either of these two wars (facts, strategies, problems, who's fighting who etc.) then it is a very interesting read.
Imprecise echoes of the Vietnam War October 30, 2006
10 out of 10 found this review helpful
On the day after coalition troops liberated the Kuwaitis from Saddam Hussein's reign, President George H.W. Bush promptly declared in front of a joint session of Congress, "By God, we've kicked the Vietnam Syndrome." He was about as precise as President George W. Bush's speech after his aircraft-carrier landing, with the infamous "Mission Accomplished" sign as a backdrop.
Is Iraq another Vietnam? The question is the title of a new volume by Robert K. Brigham, a history professor at Vassar College who co-authored another Vietnam book with former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara.
He is among a plethora of bloggers, military generals and pundits exploring the parallels. Last week Thomas Friedman of the New York Times compared the 1968 North Vietnamese offensive during the Tet lunar New Year to the recent increased insurgent attacks during Ramadan in Iraq. President Bush partially agreed with the analogy.
Brigham begins by disclaiming that the military size and scope are vastly different between the two wars. "The Vietnam War simply dwarfs the war in Iraq," he cogently writes. Vietnam escalated slowly into a full-blown war over a decade, whereas Iraq began with "shock and awe" that has been transformed into a civil war. The Iraqi insurgents don't have a charismatic leader like Ho Chi Minh or a full arsenal bankrolled by the Chinese and the Russians.
Brigham's work centers on three critical similarities: 1) The reasons for entering both wars were discredited; 2) nation-building became the secondary mission in both wars after the chaos the wars had created; and 3) as public support wanes, he cautions readers that an "Iraq Syndrome" will emerge and cripple U.S. foreign policy as the "Vietnam Syndrome" did for many years.
Brigham's publisher has called his work "the book that answers the questions on everybody's mind." Not quite. Brigham does not write about the draft, the anti-war movement or the media's role in both wars. Nevertheless, his scant academic treatment deserves attention especially for its well-written conclusion about how we can apply the lessons of Vietnam wisely.
Excerpted from a review in The Orange County Register, 10/29/06
 Too much is missing to be a very good analysis of the situaution September 6, 2006
4 out of 36 found this review helpful
Like the fact that Saddam committed genocide attempts in his mass murder of Iraqi Kurds in the 1980's (during his Anfal campaign). Brigham mentions Saddam's invasion of Kuwait distinctly enough but that was one of Saddam's secondary crimes compared to his dreaded Anfal Campaign.
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