| |  | Author: Fareed Zakaria
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Very Good Analysis and Perfect for the Kindle August 8, 2008
This is a very good overview of how the world is developing a global economy, the ways (good and bad) that the emergence of two large nation-markets (China and India) are affecting that economy, and the place of the US within it, both now and in the future.
One of the more interesting things that Zakaria illuminates are the various ways that a major power like the United States might respond to the challenges posed by an up-and-comer like China onto the world stage. He compares America's situation to that of Great Britain at the beginning of the 20th Century and discusses the way that Great Britain dealt with the emergence of the US. Further, he suggests that the US take a similar attitude toward China. That is, don't try to block China from becoming a world power. Instead, we in the US should accept China as a key player and accommodate ourselves to China's new role. This is, Zakaria says, what Britain did during the twilight years of its empire and, thus, managed to retain an influential political role for itself well past the time when it had ceased be a major economic power.
Some reviewers have charged that this book is a rehash of the work of Tom Friedman et. al. and, to some extent, that is true. However, I believe that Zakaria adds a new dimension to the established point of view that globalization's cheerleaders (like Friedman) have offered. His experience as an immigrant to the US, his roots in Indian culture, and his own personal observations give him a broader perspective and, not incidentally, one that is a good deal more optimistic than some of the others who have written on similar topics (notably Clyde Prestowitz, whose excellent book Three Billion New Capitalists I have also reviewed here on Amazon).
The Post-American World is an excellent candidate for reading on a Kindle, as the Kindle copy will cost you only $9.99 (as opposed to a hard copy at over $15.) and since the book has no maps you will not miss anything by using the Kindle. The only drawback I have found with the Kindle is that maps are not well rendered. So if you are someone who longs to read these expensive, nonfiction books before they go into paperback, the Kindle is your answer. Avid readers will recover its cost in about a year.
 excellent, poignant, and prescient August 7, 2008
0 out of 1 found this review helpful
This book should be required reading for us all. It brings together the thoughts of many of the great minds to illustrate the needs, opportunities, and challenges facing America in a world which it can no longer dominate, ignore, or control.
 More like the Post-American book August 6, 2008
2 out of 3 found this review helpful
I have mixed views on this book.
On one hand, there is a wealth of global economic information that would be interesting to anyone following the topic. The book gives you a genuine glimpse into how individuals in the countries that count as 'the rest' view current trends. This book is not uninteresting by any means.
But it has the same inherent flaws as every other book by Zakaria. Like Friedman, he puts an over-emphasis on economics and tables completely geopolitical realities. When he does mention those who would disagree with that overemphasis, his dismissive nature of those critics is way too brief. He mentions that Iran is 'Romania, not Germany' when the threat that people are concerned about is nuclear and terrorism issues, not its economic growth. He dismisses those wary of China's rise as 'neoconservatives' who don't have the facts on their side. In fact, many China watchers consistently opposed the war in Iraq. For all of Zakaria' impressive knowledge about the military balance in the early 20th century, he seems to be oblivious to the fact that China now has the world's largest submarine fleet (which makes the U.S. surface fleet in Asia he refers to quite vulnerable). Some of the anti-ship missiles they are armed with are bought from Russia for less than a million dollars each, and can sink multi-billion dollar warships. The dollar figure of military budgets is mattering less and less today, so Zakaria can't determine victory or defeat simply based on dollar figures.
The second typical flaw of a Zakaria book present in his latest one is his complete ignorance of those affected negatively of globalization. He attributes negative American feelings toward trade, immigration, and globalization to be because of scaremongering, yet all of these things have caused massive wage stagnation and manufacturing job losses in the millions since we embarked on the free trade kool-aid. For all his analyses on the reasons why civilizations fall from their place of greatness, he seems to gloss over the fact that Rome fell when it produced too little and consumed too much - a process that is replicating itself for America through globalization. There is zero sympathy to be found from the author for the auto worker who lost his job and is put in a mid life crisis because it got sent to China, and I think this sets an extremely bad precedent, especially since Barack Obama is reading this book.
If Zakaria provided more factual basis for talking down his critics and political persuasions he disagreed with, and perhaps laid out some solutions for those Americans who have been and are being slaughtered by free trade agreements, I would rate this book five stars. But it doesn't do that.
All in all, I find something very ironic about this book. It's called the 'post-American world' but the only way for that term to really be fulfilled is if we follow Zakaria's recomendations of brainless trade policy, unrestricted immigration, and selling ourselves to China so we can, as he says, "buy a couple extra lattes." It is, after all, all those things which has played a vital part in the 'rise of the rest.' Where would China and India be today without an opening of Western markets? They need the consumer base we have. And once even one fifth of their populations have a middle class that is big enough to compare to the current American consumer base, they won't need these trade agreements anymore.
Definitely not Fareed Zakaria's best book out there.
Unipolar to multipolar - but what are the poles? August 5, 2008
From the end of World War II until 2003 there was one nation that exceeded all others in economic prosperity, military strength and cultural power. That was further exemplified in 1989 when the Berlin Wall came crashing down and Hasselhoff sang for freedom. Yet, in 2003 the US's position as sole superpower - economically, politically, militarily and culturally - began to crumble.
Zakaria sees this change from a unipolar to multipolar world. While the rising powers - China, India and the EU - may not eclipse the United States in these areas, their relative power will rise (and have risen) to a degree that the United States cannot merely ignore them.
In his comparison between British Power of the early 20th century and American power, Zakaria introduces a contrast between the two. The UK had lost economic power but maintained political power - both hard (military) and soft (cultural and general good will). In the end the economic problems - of both loss of secondary and tertiary industrial dominance, and the sheer size of the new powers, the US and USSR - caused the UK to be eclipsed. Yet for a while the UK maintained a political role, through both lingering power and clever diplomacy. Zakaria shows how the current American situation is reversed. It has a loss of power - both militarily and politically (largely because of the adventure in Iraq) - but maintains its power economically.
Is it too late for the US? Zakaria thinks not; the next administration can rebuild some of the bridges the old has burnt and continue building the relationships the Bush started (i.e. with India - one of the only foreign policy situations I, personally am in agreement with the Bush Administration). Furthermore, the base of the American economic system, its financial architecture and its flexible superstructure (Zakaria does not use these nomenklatura, but that's what he means), will also allow the US to continue its economic power. What the US must do, according to Zakaria and for which I am in agreement, is build on the post War architecture of the Bretton Woods and UN systems of international organizations to create responsive procedures to new challenges - global warming, terrorism and energy security. This can be done either through the creation of new organizations directly charged with such sectors or through the broadening and deepening of powers already charged to such organizations.
While Zakaria appears to see what are the new challenges, his role in creating the current crisis in political power is glossed over at best. On pages 223-224, his mini mea culpa on the Iraq War attempts to avert some of the blame that can be laid upon him. But, he does not cover how his (and Christopher Hitchens') support of the Iraq adventure, allowed others from the center-left and the caviar gouche to not do their homework on the war before expressing support. While I have long felt Zakaria has a great grasp of the "big picture" and this book furthers that opinion, his myopic views of smaller pictures leaves much to be desired. (I am discussing not only his support for the Iraq imperialism but also such things as his attack on the left and center-left detractors of the Free Trade Area of the Americas without understanding their issues). This book fits well into his largely coherent and correct vision of the big picture. I would suggest anybody from IR geeks to casual observers pick this one up.
Refreshingly Honest Compared to Khanna's Cheap Fraud August 4, 2008
3 out of 3 found this review helpful
Well, at least Zakaria is not a complete fraud, as compared to Parag Khanna, whose book The Second World is astonishingly, breathtakingly dishonest.
Robert Kaplan describes this book as "a savvy, streetwise primer on dozens of individual countries that adds up to a coherent theory of global politics." (Which shows just how ignorant of much of Eurasia Kaplan truly is.) Having been generously praised in book reviews in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Financial Times, among other publications, I ordered the book with great interest. And as I began to read this book, I was at first shocked, and then increasingly appalled, at a systematic pattern of serious errors of fact, ludicrous assertions that jarred with reality, fundamental misunderstandings of basic economics or history, cheap clichés, and recorded conversations which struck me as obviously fabricated. Every chapter is riddled with astonishing flaws, but here I will simply address those dealing with the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.
Khanna's basic thesis is three-fold. He states the United States, the European Union, and China are the three dominant geo-political powers in the world today. He proceeds to argue that there is a "second world" of countries, belonging neither to the developed "first world" nor to the chronically underdeveloped "third world." And, Khanna writes, the big three global powers compete against one another for geo-political and economic advantage in this "second world," even as they themselves form regional alliances and seek to play the superpowers against one another.
None of these seem to be terribly original ideas. In his preface, Khanna states a wish to follow in the footsteps of English historian Toynbee, who in his retirement took a world tour. And in the second paragraph there is a foreboding of the tone of the book: Khanna states that a "leatherbound first edition of Toynbee's narrative" was his companion on his own world tour. Throughout, Khanna shows a predisposition for smarmy arrogance and condescension. And yet the book is shockingly empty of real insights, even as it boasts an index stretching to twenty-four pages, and an acknowledgment thanking some five hundred people. The impression is that Khanna wants you to know how many important people he knows and how many factoids he can fit into a 500 page book.
Some of the various, and numerous, factual errors that riddle the book are relatively trivial, but suggest serious sloppiness and disregard for getting facts right. For example, Yugoslavia was not part of Warsaw pact, as Khanna states. Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov was appointed to office in 1992 by Boris Yeltsin, and not by Vladimir Putin. Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Albania are not all smaller by population than Manhattan, and the death toll from the civil wars in former Yugoslavia was not greater than half a million. Other obviously wrong assertions seem to be made up simply to provide lurid background color to Khanna's travelogue: the former KGB headquarters in Moscow has not been turned into "a high-class disco," expensive Moscow malls do not charge entrance fees, and police road checkpoints in Uzbekistan do not stop and check all vehicles. And other gross misstatements of fact display a simple complete lack of understanding the history and culture of the countries of which he writes: the (Orthodox) Uspenky cave monastery in Crimea is not representative of Ukraine's "proud Catholic heritage," Zoran Djindjic was not the first democratically elected leader since World War II in former Yugoslavia , and in the 1980s Yugoslav republics like Bosnia and Macedonia were not richer than Spain. Many of Khanna's wildly wrong claims sound like local myths that he has taken at face value. I can easily imagine some misguided elderly Belgrade resident waxing nostalgically for the days "when every one of our republics was richer than Spain!"
Yet more of Khanna's assertions are not merely factually wrong, but far exceed the ludicrous. In the fast paced and dangerous Russian business world, "one is safe only in the sauna, where everyone is naked and no weapons are allowed." It was news to me to learn from Khanna that every winter "waves" of Russians and "thousands of Ukrainians" freeze to death in "crumbling heatless apartment blocks." And he employs gross mischaracterizations of fact to buttress his claims. For example, according to Khanna, in 2006 Greek GDP increased 25% when the government started to account for prostitution and cigarette smuggling in its figures. In fact, the government said it would include all unreported economic activity, mostly in construction and trade, but including a "small" amount for illegal activities such as smuggling. And this is merely a sampling of patently ridiculous claims.
And for a "foreign policy whiz-kid," Khanna makes numerous and serious analytical mistakes, showing a clear misunderstanding of economics, international institutions, and international relations. The unhedged statement, "Russia's diplomatic position is purely residual," will surely surprise diplomats from Brussels to Tokyo. Noting that Gazprom's market capitalization is $300 billion leads Khanna to the conclusion that Gazprom is one third of the Russian economy, confusing market capitalization with GDP. And his bald assertion that "[n]one of Central Asian legal systems have evolved beyond Kakfaaesque" is belied by the numerous successful legislative accomplishments of Kazakhstan and its quite sophisticated legal code, for example.
He has harsh words for the United States, bordering on hysteria. Likewise, he sees the European Union as a beacon of progress and a model for the future. And yet he betrays a clear lack of understanding of EU institutions. For example, Britain does not share with Turkey a similar status of "privileged partner" of the EU, converg[ing] with the EU only when it suits their interests." And while he manages to drop the names of hundreds of obscure statesmen and scholars, there is not one mention of Jean Monnet.
And this awful book is chock-a-block with cheap clichés. Vladimir Putin is a "steely former KGB official." A "Soviet era foreign ministry building" and "Soviet era apartment buildings" alike are "hulking." Here in Moscow, there is a "perpetually insecure business caste that lives each day like its last, partying with exotic lions and dominatrix dancers, complete with plenty of caviar." One must pity the "champagne-soaked, Hummer-driving scions" of Kiev, who must settle for "fancy nightclubs such as Decadence." And "Kiev, like Moscow, is a Potemkin village."
And many of the clichés regarding Russia and Ukraine are not merely examples of poor imagination and lack of writing skill, they are downright ugly. "From cars to construction, if something in Russia works it is probably European." Khanna obviously has not been to any modern Russian manufacturing facilities. He also writes that the Baltic states view "the formerly great Russian bear like an alcoholic uncle, with a mixture f pity and concern." In a stunning bit of cultural hubris, Khanna sneers "Georgians may be Christians, but they are not European in any meaningful sense - no matter how relentlessly they fly the EU flag across the capital city, Tbilisi."
But the worst moments of Khanna's book are when he quotes conversations that seem of such dubious authenticity as to make me believe they may be fabricated, or at best the result of very selective reporting, only relating those comments that fit within his pre-existing views. "'Our pride has suffered'" explains a "Moscow intellectual over a narrow glass of [of course] ice-chilled vodka, `but this only drives our nationalism further.'" In Kiev, the locals "give lifts to strangers for a token fare." Why? "We suffered enough together, so we still trust each other." There are just too many such (anonymous) quotations that fail to ring true to trust in the author's integrity. And he also reports statements by national leaders as if they were heard in personal conversation, yet in a curiously indirect fashion that suggests otherwise. "'To hell with the Russians!' fumed Saakashvili" sounds like reportage of a personal conversation between Khanna and the Georgian president, but I suspect a more honest account would read like "the President was quoted in the Financial Times as saying `to hell with the Russians.'"
And Khanna makes innumerable observations that he believes show particular insight, but are shocking banal if thought over for a mere moment. He notes dryly that Turkey is "a country that has fought wars with nearly all its neighbours." Well, so is France. And in fact just about every country which has been around for the 20th century, or earlier, has fought its neighbours at one time or another. (Actually, if you refer merely to the modern state of Turkey, and not with reference to its Ottoman predecessor, it has fought wars with none of its neighbors. Khanna is a kind of reverse-genius at getting facts 100% wrong.) He also notes with immense concern that "Russian and Chinese firms now control most of [Uzbekistan's] mineral deposits." It doesn't seem obvious to Khanna that Russia and China are quite natural trading partners and sources of foreign investment.
Overall, just about the worst book I've ever read, and exceedingly dishonest to boot.
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